February, 1929

ANNOUNCEMENT
THE REVIEW takes pleasure in announcing the election of the
following members of the Second Year Class. To the Editorial
Board: Samuel A. Armstrong, W. Frederick Colclough, Jr., Joseph
First, Meyer L. Girsh, Louis Gorrin, D. Benjamin Kresh, Mark E.
Lefever, Elias Magil, R. Paul Mitchell, Gertrude Richman, Maxwell
S. Rosenfeld, Andrew J. Schroder, II, John A. Skelton, Jr., Fraley N.
Weidner, Jr., and Carroll R. Wetzel. To the Business Board: George
W. Keitel, Clarence Mesirov and Dawson H. Muth.

NOTES
THE LAW SCHOL-In the fall of 1926 the Provost and Trustees
of the University established the University Placement Service, under
the Directorship of Professor Clarence E. Clewell, with offices at 34oo
ralnut Street.
It was believed that important advantages from the creation of
such a service would flow to the general alumni, by aiding them to
secure positions or to improve them; and to industries and professions, locally and nationally, by aiding them in the selection of their
personnel from alumni whose credentials indicate they are qualified
for the position under consideration, and whose recommendation has
the sanction and expressed approval of the school from which they
graduated, and which knows their ability and personality.
It was recognized that, both from the point of view of the graduate seeking a position and of the office seeking the lawyer, placement
work within the legal profession (as also in the case of the medical
profession and highly technical engineering positions) involves a high
degree of intimacy with personal and confidential factors, best obtained
by fixing final responsibility for all recommendations of law graduates
in the office of the Dean of the Law School, to whom inquiries, when
directed to the University Placement Service, would be referred. The
effort which the Law School has for many years made to aid graduates
in establishing themselves in practice, and to aid offices and corporations in recruiting their associates, is being carried on, under this
regime, by Dean Mikell, his Assistant, Layton B. Register, the Law
School's representative on the University Placement Service Committee, by the Law Faculty, and by the University Placement Service,
with the same degree of caution and personal interest as in the past,
but with the additional advantages which derive from being a branch
of the very efficient and far-reaching University Placement Service,
whose valuable records and wide contacts are at the disposal of the
Law School.
The possibilities of usefulness of this service, already well re-
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alized by the students of the Law School, have not as yet been so fully
appreciated by the Bar. The work, it is believed, should not be limited
solely to bringing the June graduate's need of a position to the attention of the law office, but should extend to the furnishing of reciprocal
help when the lawyer sought and the lawyer seeking a new association
are men of older experience. Both types of service require for their
development that members of the Bar shall more frequently communicate their needs in these respects, so that well-qualified candidates,
expressly sanctioned and approved by the Dean's office, can be
obtained.
Inquiries may be addressed either to the Dean's office, 3400
Chestnut Street, or to the Director of the University Placement
Service, 3400 Walnut Street, Philadelphia.
William E. Mikell,
Dean.
LIABILITY TO TRESPASSERS AND LICENSEES OF ONE MAINTAINING ELECTRIC WIRES IN A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON PREMISES OF
A recent New York decision2 raises once more the
interesting question as to the right of recovery of a trespasser who is
injured by coming in contact with defectively insulated wires belonging
to a person other than the landowner. This note purports to investigate that problem confining itself to those cases wherein the defendant
permitted electric wires to exist in a dangerous condition, of which
he knew or should have known. The fault of the defendant, then, is
assumed and the inquiry is in what manner his liability is limited by
the relation of the parties to the landowner. In order to determine
the extent of this liability, it will be necessary to distinguish the various situations that may arise. The plaintiff may be either a trespasser
or a licensee," and in either category we must further distinguish
A THIRD PARTY1

Note on Terminology: The term landowner is used to designate one in the
possession of land, whether it be as owner of the fee or under a lesser right. It
includes all against whose possession the trespass is an offense. The term trespasser is used to designate one who is neither suffered nor invited to enter the
premises. It includes all who come upon the premises without right The term
bare licensee is used to designate one whose presence is not invited, but tolerated.
It includes that class of persons aptly described as "tolerated intruders." The
term actual licensee is used to designate one whose presence is not invited, but
permitted. It includes that class of persons who fall short of being invitees, but
yet are more than tolerated intruders. The term paid licensee is used to designate an actual licensee who pays for the privilege of coming upon the land. The
term inv4tee is used to designate one who is invited to come upon the premises,
either expressly or impliedly.
2 Ferrar v. N. Y. Central R. R., 2.4 App. Div. 182, 230 N. Y. Supp. 6o
(1928). For a cursory comment see (1928) 6 N. Y. U. LAW REv. 82.
' The writer has not found it useful to distinguish between different types
of licensees in this connection. Furthermore, cases applying to plaintiffs who are
invitees have been ignored, inasmuch as the liability of the landowner, and consequently of one maintaining wires over the landowner's premises, is unquestioned.

NOTES

between adults and infants. The defendant may be a trespasser, a
bare licensee, an actual licensee, a paid licensee or an invitee. Thus
it immediately becomes apparent that a proper investigation of this
problem involves a consideration of twenty different factual situations.
Much of the confusion that has arisen in this field of tort law is
directly traceable to the failure of courts and writers to recognize the
differences existing between these various groups. With this classification in mind we shall proceed to an analysis of the cases.
Cases in Which the Plaintiff is a Trespasser
In all of the cases in this section, the plaintiff is a trespasser,
either adult or infant, and the defendant belongs to one of the five
groups mentioned above.
I. Where the defendant is a trespasser, it seems to be the law
and sound law that he is liable to a plaintiff who is also a trespasser,
whether infant or adult. There is very little authority on the point
where the plaintiff is an adult.4

However, where the plaintiff is an

infant, there are several decisions 5 holding the defendant liable. The
theory of the decisions attaches little weight to the fact that the plaintiff is a juvenile, but rests principally on the proposition that the
defense that the plaintiff is a trespasser is not available to the defendant who is himself a trespasser. In Guinm v. Delaware and Atlantic
Telephone Co.,8 the leading case dealing with this situation, the court
said:
"The test of defendant's liability to a particular person is
whether injury to him ought reasonably to have been anticipated.
. . . The general rule is that a person is liable for those results
of his negligence which are reasonably to be anticipated; the
exemption of the landowner from liability as to trespassers and
licensees is necessary to secure him the beneficial use of his land,
but no reason exists for extending this exemption to the case
where the rights of the defendant have not been interfered with."
A lone New Hampshire case 7 denies that the defendant is liable.
The decision is placed on the ground that the case falls into the
"attractive nuisance" class and since New Hampshire does not follow
the "attractive nuisance" doctrine," the plaintiff cannot recover. The

' See Birmingham Ry. v. Cockrum,
5

179 Ala. 372, 6o So. 304
202 Iowa 517, 21o N.

Lipovac v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co.,

(1912).

W. 573 (1926),

commented on in (1926) 25 MicH. LAW REv. 554; Guinn v. Del. & At. Tel. Co.,
72 N. J. L. 276, 62 Atl. 412 (1905) ; Wittleder v. Citizens' Electric Illuminating Co., 47 App. Div. 41o, 62 N. Y. Supp. 297 (igoO), aff'd 5o App. Div. 478,
64 N. Y. Supp. 114 (igoo); Daltry v. Media Elec. Light Co., 2o8 Pa. 403,
57 Atl. 833 (19o4).
"Supra note 5.
'Devost v. Twin State Gas Co., 79 N. H. 411, 1o9 Adt. 839 (1920).
"For exhaustive note on this doctrine, see (1925) 36 A. L. R. 34.
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fallacy in placing the case in that category is apparent, since such an
approach ignores the important distinction that the defendant was
himself a trespasser in locating on land belonging to a third party.
II. The fact that the defendant is a bare licensee rather than a
trespasser should not alter his liability. He cannot by any stretch of
the imagination claim to stand in the position of the landowner. However, there is an almost complete absence of decisions on this point.
No cases have been found bearing on the situation where the defendant is a bare licensee, and the plaintiff is a trespasser. There is one
decision holding the defendant liable to an infant trespasserY The
basis of the court's decision was that the defendant could foresee the
presence of trespassers, and the defendant himself having no proprietary interest could not complain that the plaintiff was a trespasser.
Clearly such considerations would apply equally well to an adult trespasser.
III. Considering next the situation in which the defendant is an
actual licensee, the law is unsettled and the decisions are conflicting.
Some courts assimilate the licensee to the landowner, others do not.
It is difficult to draw any general conclusions. When the plaintiff is
an adult trespasser, Georgia, 10 Maryland "- and Michigan ' 2 have held
that the defendant stands in the position of the landowner and owes
no duty to trespassers. However, opposed to these authorities stands
the well-considered
case of Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Electric
Co.,13 the opinion of which very forcefully criticizes the other view:
"Traced to its source, the rule exempting a landowner from
liability to a trespasser injured through the condition of the premises is found to have originated in an over-zealous desire to safeguard the right of ownership as it was regarded under a system
of landed estates, long since abandoned, under which the law
ascribed a peculiar sanctity to rights therein. .

.

. A trespass

is an injury to the possession; and as it is only he whose possession is disturbed who can sue therefor, so it should be that he
alone, could assert the unlawful invasion when suit is brought by
an injured trespasser. One should not be allowed 'to defend an
indefensible act' by showing that the party injured was engaged
in doing something which, as to a third person was unlawful."
f Burnett v. Fort Worth Light Co., i17 S. W. 175 (Texas Civ. App. i9o8);
cf. Austin v. Public Service Co., 299 Ill. 112, 132 N. E. 458 (i92r) (plaintiff
was held to have been guilty of contributory negligence), commented on in
(ig2)
x6 Iu. L. REv. 477.
"°Augusta R. R. v. Andrews, 89 Ga. 653, 1i S. E. 203 (x892), aff'd 92 Ga.
706, i9 S. E. 713 (1893).
"Stansfield v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 123 Md. 120, 91 AtI.
149 (1914).
2
McCaughna v. Owosso Electric Co., 129 Mich. 407, 89 N. W. 73 (1902):
Parshall v. Leeper Gas-Electric Co., 228 Mich. 8o, i99 N. W. 599 (1924).
i 39 Atl. 440 (Vt. 1927).

NOTES

The same diversity of opinion exists when the plaintiff is an
infant trespasser. Decisions in six jurisdictions 14 hold the defendant
liable, on the theory that regardless of his position as licensee, he owes
a duty of care to all persons whose presence on the premises he may
anticipate. Several of the cases '5 emphasize the fact that the defendant is dealing in a highly dangerous substance and hold that especially
because of this factor he must take reasonable precautions to safeguard all persons who he can foresee may be injured. But none of
these cases 16 turn on the fact that the plaintiffs were children rather
than adults, except in the sense that the trespasses of children are
more foreseeable.1 7 However, there are decisions in three other jurisdictions 18 allowing an infant to recover which do rest peculiarly on the
"attractive nuisance" doctrine. 0
"Edwards v. Kansas City, io4 Kan. 684, i8o Pac. 271 (igig); Temple v.
McComb Power Co., 89 Miss. 1, 42 So. 874 (i9o6) ; Grady v. Louisiana Light
Co., 253 S. W. 202 (Mo. App., 1923) ; Beckwith v. City of Malden, 212 Mo. App.
488, 253 S. W. 7 (923); Benton v. North Carolina Pub. Service Co., i65 N.
C. 354, 81 S. E. 448 (914); Wolf v. Ford, 7 Ohio App. 461 (917) ; Lynchburg Telephone Co. v. Bowlser, 1o3 Va. 595, 5o S. E. 148 (i9o5) ; cf. Graves v.

Washington Water Power Co., 44 Wash. 675, 87 Pac. 956 (i9o6).
' Wolf v. Ford, Lynchburg Telephone Co. v. Bowlser, both spra note 14;
cf. Graves v. Washington Water Power Co., supra note 14; Note (1928) 76
U. OF PA. L. REv. 844.
" See, however, Wolf v. Ford, supra note 14.
' Edwards v. Kansas City, Temple -. McComb Power Co., Beckwith v.
City of Malden, Benton v. North Carolina Pub. Service Co., Lynchburg Telephone Co. v. Bowlser, all supra note 14.
'Hurd

v. Phoenix Co., 30 Del. 332, io6 Atl. 286 (i9i);

Stedwell v.

Chicago, 297 I1. 486, i3o N. E. 729 (i9g2) ; Gherra v. Central Illinois Public
Service Co., 212 Ill. App. 48 (igi8) (In this case the Illinois Court specifically
decided that unless the facts constituted an "attractive nuisance," the infant
could not recover) ; Zuidersich v. Minnesota Utilities Co., i55 Minn. 293, 193
N. V. 449 (923); see Mayfield Water & Light Co. v. Webb's Admr., 129 Ky.
395, rII S. W. 712 (i9o8). For an interesting comment on the last case, see
(19xI) 72 CENT. L. J. 121, 122. Washington, though it applies the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine generally, seems reluctant to extend it to these cases. In
this regard see Grave v. Washington Water Power Co., supra note 14; cf. however Clark v. Longview Public Service Co., infra note 31. An early Kansas
case, Consolidated Power Co. v. Healy, 65 Kan. 798, 70 Pac. 884 (i9o2), allowed a child to recover, resting its decision on the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.
However, a later case, Edwards v. Kansas City, mtpra note 14, which involved
the same situation, rested its decision on the broader ground that a licensee owes
a duty of care to all persons whose presence on the premises he can foresee.
" An investigation of the cases in which the defendant ig an actual licensee
and the plaintiff is an infant trespasser, reveals another sidelight on this question in two jurisdictions. In Johnson v. City of St. Charles, 200 Ill. App. 184
(i916), and in Shannon v. Kansas Power Co., 287 S. W. 1031 (Mo. App.
i9216). the court held that where the defendant allows wires to remain in a
position other than that contemplated by the license, his property right is inferior to the plaintiff's right of action. Therefore the defendant cannot set up
the fact that the plaintiff was a trespasser, because as to the defendant, he was
not a trespasser. This view is particularly applicable to those cases where an
electric wire has fallen from its normal position and is dangling in mid-air or
else is sagging close to the ground.
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Three courts, on the other hand, absolutely protect the defendant
licensee even though the plaintiff is an infant. Georgia 20 holds no
liability, without assigning reasons. New Hampshire 2 denies a recovery because it does not follow the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.
However, that state is out of line with most jurisdictions,2 2 since it
holds that the defendant is not liable even when he is a trespasser.
Maryland, as has already been pointed out above,2" denies a recovery
when the plaintiff is an adult and, since it does not recognize the
"attractive nuisance" doctrine, consistently holds that the defendant is
not liable when the plaintiff is an infant.2"
Considering all the cases in which the defendant was an actual
licensee and properly evaluating them, it would seem that there is a
slight weight of authority in favor of holding him liable to a plaintiff
trespasser. Certainly the better reasoned opinions are to that effect.
IV. Where the defendant is a paid licensee, and the plaintiff an
adult trespasser, a North Carolina decision 25 holds the defendant
liable, principally because the fact that the plaintiff is a trespasser will
not bar him from recovery.
On the other hand in the only case in which the plaintiff is an
infant trespasser, Texas 28 holds the defendant not liable, on the
theory that he stands in the same position as the landowner. In that
jurisdiction, unless an "attractive nuisance" case is made out, the
plaintiff cannot recover.
The dearth of cases dealing with this situation makes it difficult
to draw any definite conclusions, other than to say that the paid
licensee occupies a more favored position in the law than an actual
licensee. The paid licensee practically stands in the same position as
the landowner, since he is a lessee of that space through which his
wires travel.27
V. Where the defendant is an invitee, on the land primarily for
his own benefit, such as a power supplier, and the plaintiff is an adult
trespasser, there is an even split of authority. Kentucky 2s and New
' Brown v. Panola Power Co., 137 Ga. 352, 73 S. E. 580 (i9 i).
SMcCaffrey v. Concord Electric Co., go N. H. 45, 114 AtI. 395 (1921).
For comment see (1921) 31 YATx L. J. io2.
-2 Supra, p. 507.
Supra note ii.
Grube v. Mayor of Baltimore, 132 Md. 355, io3 Atl. 848 (i918).

'Ferrell v. Durham Traction Co., 172 N. C. 682, 9o S. E. 893 (i916) (two
judges dissenting). The court quoted and followed Benton v. N. C. Pub. Service Co., supra note 14, which allowed an infant trespasser to recover from an
actual licensee.
1McCoy v. Texas Light Co., 229 S. W. 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
SCf. note I9 supra--explaining how two jurisdictions hold that a licensee
loses his license when his wires are not exactly where allowed by license.
I City of Henderson v. Ashby, 179 Ky. 507, 200 S. W. 931 (i918). For a
good comment see (r917) 66 U. oF PA. L. REV. 378. Kentucky is a rather.

NOTES

York '9 hold the defendant not liable, the theory being that since the
plaintiff was a trespasser, he bad no right to be where he was when
the injury happened, and therefore the defendant did not have to
anticipate his presence. On the other side stand Missouri and Washington. Under the Missouri view,30 the defendant is liable to trespassers when trespassers have been there before, and the defendant
can anticipate that they will be there again. Under the Washington
view,3 the defendant is liable to anyone-trespasser, licensee or invitee-whose presence on the premises he can foresee. This is the
broadest and most modem view of all, and is undoubtedly indicative
of the trend of the decisions.
Where the plaintiff is an infant trespasser, there exists a similar
conflict of authorities. Three courts 32 hold the defendant liable
whenever the presence of the trespassers could have been anticipated.
Cases in three other states 33 make the plaintiff's recovery dependent
on the "attractive nuisance" doctrine. In two jurisdictions 3' the
defendant's freedom from liability is the same as that of the landowner.
Two opposing forces are seen at work in all the cases in this
section. On the one hand, it is difficult to deny that an invitee stands
substantially in the position of the landowner. On the other hand, it
is undoubtedly true that the exemption of the landowner from liability
to trespassers is a relic of a "system of landed estates" which no
longer exists, and of a comparatively simple economic state of society
which is replaced today by one of rapidly increasing complexity. For
this very good reason, many courts have refused to extend the landowner's exemption to anyone else. Though all the cases are necessarily recent, the most recent undoubtedly evidence a tendency to
adhere to the latter principle.
conservative jurisdiction. It apparently refuses to allow an infant trespasser to
recover against an actual licensee-unless the facts constitute an "attractive nuisance." See Mayfield Water & Light Co. v. Webb's Admr., supra note I8.
- Hickok v. Auburn Power Co., 20o N. Y. 464, 93 N. E. 113 (I9II) ; cf.
Caglione v. Mt. Morris Electric Light Co., 56 App. Div. I91, 67 N. Y. Supp.
66o (igoo) (where injury occurred in a public place).
'0 Kribs v. Jefferson City Light Co., 199 S. W. 261 (Mo. App. 1917).
tm

Clark v. Longview Public Service Co., 143 Wash. 319, 255 Pac. 380 (927).

The comment in (1928) 28 CoL LAw REv. 248 fails to do the case justice.
'Godfrey v. Kansas Power Co., 229 Mo. 472, 253 S.W. 233 (1923) (three
judges dissenting) ; O'Gore v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 244 Pa. 156, go Adt.
529 (1914) ; Ellis v. Ashton Power Co., 41 Idaho io6, 238 Pac. 517 (925).
' Hayes v. Southern Power Co., 95 S.C. 230, 78 S.E. 956 (I913) (allowing

a recovery); Davis v. Melvery Power Co., 186 Iowa 884, 173 N. W. 262 (1919)
(denying a recovery); Myer v. Union Power Co., 151 Ky. 332, 151 S. WN.941
(1912) (denying a recovery).
3
'Key West Electric Co. v. Roberts. 81 Fla. 743, 89 So. 122 (3921); Robbins v. Minute Tapioca Co., 236 Mass. 387, 128 N. E. 417 (1920).
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Cases in Which the Plaintiff Is a Licensee

In all of the cases in this section, the plaintiff is a licensee,15
either infant or adult, and the defendant belongs to one of the five
groups discussed in the previous section.
I. Though there are few cases in point, the law would seem to
be well settled that a trespasser is liable to an adult or infant licensee.
Where plaintiff is an adult licensee, California 36 holds the defendant
liable on the theory that the plaintiff was rightfully on the land
whereas the defendant was wrongfully on the land. This accurately
states the relative rights of the parties. Opposed to this view, is an
aberration of the Kentucky Supreme Court 37 which holds the defendant not liable on the theory that the defendant stands in the same
position as the landowner. It is obvious that such a position can be
supported only on the most specious reasoning, for a trespasser manifestly has no proprietary interest whatsoever.
Where the plaintiff is an infant licensee, Massachusetts 31 and
Missouri 39 hold the defendant-liable on two separate theories. Massachusetts bases liability on the ground that the plaintiff is on the land
in the owner's right, and the defendant, whether rightfully or wrongfully on the land, is responsible for his failure to take care. Missouri
predicates liability on the ground that the presence of a bare licensee
can be anticipated. Of the two views, the latter appears to be preferable.
II. As to the situation where the defendant is a bare licensee, and
the plaintiff is a licensee, either infant or adult, no cases have been
found. On principle no distinction in liability should exist between
this situation and the one where the defendant is a trespasser inasmuch
as a bare licensee is only a tolerated intruder.
III. Where the defendant is an actual licensee, and the plaintiff
an adult licensee, most of the jurisdictions in which the question has
arisen 40 hold the defendant not liable because the defendant stands in
the same position as the landowner. However, this does not warrant
the conclusion that such is generally the law.4
' Licensee is used in this section in a loose sense. The term includes those
who have hitherto been referred to as bare licensees and actual licensees. It does
not include paid licensees, invitees or employees.
Davoust v. Alameda, 149 Cal. 69, 84 Pac. 76o (I9O6).
SCumb. Tel. Co. v. Martin, 1i6 Ky. 554, 76 S. W. 394 (i9o3).
Boutlier v. City of Malden, 226 Mass. 479, 1i6 N. E. 251 (917).
'Williams v. Springfield Gas, etc., Co., 274 Mo. I, 202 S. W. i (x918).
" Rodgers v. Union Light Co., 123 S. W. 293 (Ky. i9og) ; Hafey v. Dwight
Mfg. Co., 24o Mass. 155, 133 N. E. io7 (i92i) ; New Omaha, etc., Light Co. v.
Anderson, 73 Neb. 84, IO2 N. W. 89 (i9o5); Greenville v. Pitts, 1O2 Tex. i, io7

S. W. 50 (i9o8).
'The decisions in the Massachusetts and Nebraska cases are squarely in
point. However the Nebraska case is comparatively an old one in this field, and
the Massachusetts court has shown a distinctly conservative attitude on this entire problem.
Cf. Robbins v. Minute Tapioca Co., supra note 34- The Ken-

NOTES

This is made more apparent by a consideration of the cases in
which the plaintiff is an infant licensee. In this situation, there are
decisions in six jurisdictions holding the defendant liable, and none to
the contrary. Most of these decisions 42 base liability on the ground
that the defendant can anticipate that injury will happen to persons
who are rightfully on the land, such as licensees. Another view 43 is
that since the defendant is dealing in a very dangerous substance, he
owes a high degree of care to that part of the public who are rightfully
on the land. Pennsylvania 44 holds the defendant liable because the
plaintiff licensee is in the same position as the landowner. The theory
of all these decisions would apply equally well to the case where the"
plaintiff is an adult.
IV. Where the defendant is a paid licensee and the plaintiff an
adult licensee, a single New York case 45 holds the defendant liable on
the ground that his conduct amounted to gross negligence. Where
the plaintiff is an infant licensee, Indiana 4' holds the defendant liable
on the theory that since the landowner would have been liable under
the circumstances, the defendant is liable.
Since a paid licensee is in a sense a lessee of the space he occupies,
it might be argued that he should owe no greater duty of care than
the landowner. Certainly he owes as great a duty and a modem court
might very well refuse to extend the historic exemption of the landowner to this other class.
V. Where the defendant is an invitee, on the land primarily for
his own benefit, such as a power supplier, and the plaintiff is an adult
licensee, two jurisdictions 47 hold the defendant liable because he can
tucky and Texas cases, while decided on the broad ground indicated, might be
distinguished for the reason that in both cases the defendant could not foresee
injury to the class of which the plaintiff was a member.
'; Nelson v. Bradford Lighting Co., 75 Conn. 548, 54 Atl. 303 (9o3) ; Fort
Wayne Traction Co. v. Stark, 74 Ind. App. 669, 127 N. E. 46o (I92O); Thomp(In Devost v. Twin
son v. Tilton Electric Co., 77 N. H. 92, 88 At. 216 (913).
State Gas Co., sispra note 7, the principal case is distinguished as one where the
plaintiff was not a trespasser and was rightfully where he was); Meyer v.
Menominee Light Co., 1i Wis. 279, 138 N. W. ioo8 (1912).
, Com. Elec. Co. v. Melville, 210 I1. 70, 7o N. E. 1052 (i9o4).
"Mullen v. Wilkes-Barre, etc., Elec. Co., 229 Pa. 54, 77 At. iio8 (igio).
"Keith v. Payne, 164 App. Div. 642, 1SO N. Y. Supp. 37 (914).
" Terre Haute, etc., Traction Co. v. Sanders, 8o Ind. App. i6, 136 N. E. 54
(1922).
(Defendant power company licensed the right to erect wires and poles
from a railroad who owned a right of way. The public had used the right of
way for years. Plaintiff's thirteen year old intestate son was walking along the
right of way when he saw the end of a broken wire dangling near the ground.
He grasped it and was killed. Held: Plaintiff's intestate was a licensee, and
defendant was liable for its negligence. "While a mere licensee goes upon the
lands of the licensor at his own risk and takes the premises as he finds them, the
licensor has no right to create a new danger while the license continies.")
'Barnett v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 87 N. J. L. 29, 93 Aft. io8 (I915),
commented on in (1914) 28 HARv. L. REv. 818, and in (0915) 5o NAT. CoR'.
REP. 582; Oil Belt Power Co. v. Touchstone, 266 S. W. 432 (Tev. Civ. App.
1924).
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anticipate the presence of licensees. One jurisdiction's holds the
defendant not liable on the theory that the defendant stands in the
position of the landowner who owes no duty to the plaintiff under such
circumstances.
Where the plaintiff is an infant licensee, an isolated case 9 holds
the defendant not liable, because under the particular facts, the defendant could not anticipate the presence of licensees.
From these few cases, it can be deduced that the tendency is to
hold a defendant who is an invitee liable to a licensee be he either
adult or infant, when his presence can be anticipated.
Conclusion
The rule of law, which is so well settled that it may be said to be
axiomatic, that a landowner is not liable to trespassers or licensees
save to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring them, has undeniably played an active part in the decisions. This rule, which arose
at a time when the courts were engaged in the policy of actively favoring the landed interests has so stamped itself upon Anglo-Saxon law
that our problem cannot be considered without recognizing that the
liability of the defendant is somewhat dependent on how close his
status approaches that of a landowner.
Where the defendant is a trespasser or a bare licensee, he has no
property right that can be said to be subject to protection, and the
cases have so held. Directly in line is the recent case 50 mentioned in
the beginning of this note. The court there refused to hold the
landowner liable to an infant trespasser, but did not hesitate to fasten
liability on an electric company that was treated as a bare licensee,
when it permitted wires to exist in a dangerous condition on the landowner's premises.
As soon as the defendant falls into the classes of actual licensee
or paid licensee or invitee, the problem is not so easily settled and the
decisions are anything but harmonious. Many courts have great difficulty in finding a logical distinction between the position of such persons and that of the landowner. However, it seems that the courts
are now, in the main, loath to apply the rule exempting landowners
4
Pennebacker v. San Joaquim, etc., Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459
(igio) (There is a strong dissenting opinion).
9
" Sheffield v. Morton, 49 So. 772, 161 Ala. 153 (1909). Criticized in 72
(A ten year old child going upon a bluff in an unCENT. L. J. 121, 122 (1911).
inclosed lot, frequented by the public in large numbers, could not be considered a
trespasser by an electric company, which had strung its wires on the bluff where
it was not the owner of the land, but must be considered as upon the lot by the
implied license of the owner. However, defendant is not liable, because the
child's presence could not be anticipated, when the child climbed to a spot difficult of access and came in contact with the wire.)

"0Snpra note i.

NOTES

from liability to a defendant unless he actually is a landowner. This
wise recognition of the relative value of a human life and a technical
property right is a testimonial to the progressiveness of a muchcriticised system of jurisprudence.
C. Polis.
Philadelphia,Pa.
LIABILITY FOR INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT TO MARRY-

Prefatory observations of most writers on the law of marriage define
the general attitude of the common law on the subject as that of an
ardent protector, perhaps, as any one who is familiar with the memorable trial of Mrs. Bardell against Pickwick will attest, sometimes
too ardent a protector. However, in view of a second and conflicting
tendency that clearly exists in this field of the law, to interfere as little
as possible, this is only a partial truth. In no other single instance
is this conflict of policies more clearly manifested than in the treatment
of the question of the liability of one who successfully instigates
another to breach an existing contract to marry.
Courts have uniformly held that the law can offer no remedy to
one who has been damaged by another's statements which have induced a breach of promise,1 however malicious and morally reprehensible the defendant's conduct may have been in procuring such
breach, provided the statements were not slanderous. In this connection, the phraseology of Cooley in his work on Torts,2 has been used
as a basis for whatever argument there has been on the subject. This
now famous passage declares:
"The prevention of a marriage by the interference of a third
person, cannot, in general, in itself, be a legal wrong. Thus if
one, by solicitation, or by the arts of ridicule or otherwise, shall
induce one to break off an existing contract of marriage, no action
will lie for it, however contemptible and blamable may be the
conduct."
However, a recent New Jersey case, Minsky v. Satenstein,3
clearly announces a different rule. Briefly, the doctrine advanced is
that an action lies against a stranger who maliciously procures another
to breach a contract to marry. The adjudication is of prime importance because it at once brings into question the validity of the hitherto accepted reasons in support of the older rule. So strongly is the
ILeonard v. Whetstone, 34 Ind. App. 383, 68 N. E. 197 (903) ; Homan v.
Hall, =O2Neb. 70, 165 N. W. 88r, commented on in (1917) 66 U. oF PA. L.
Ray. 279; Guida v. Pontrelli, 114 Misc. 181, 186 N. Y. Supp. 147 (1921); Stiffler v. Boehm, 124 Misc. 55, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 187 (1924) ; Overhultz v. Row, 152
La. 9, 92 So. 716 (1922).
Contra: Gunn v. Barr, I D. L. R. 855 (Canada,
1926).
2
CooLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 19o6) 494.
3 143 Aft. 512 (N. J.1928).
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problem linked with precedent, however, that any discussion would be
futile unless the action for inducing breach of contract, with all its
ramifications, be retrospectively scrutinized, so that its applicability to
contracts to marry will fully appear in the light of the decided cases.
The origin of the general action of tort for procuring a breach of
contract is to be found in the ancient action 4 brought by a master
against a person enticing away a servant. To create a right of action
the defendant must have resorted to violence in the act 7 and must
have wilfully and maliciously interfered with the existing master and
servant relationship.' The Statute of Laborers' in 1349, eliminated
the requisite of violence, so that an action existed for the mere enticing of one's servant. It must be remembered that these were trespass
actions, and that the existing relation of master and servant created
the duty on the part of others to abstain from acts injurious to the
maintenance of the relationship." So deeply enrooted in the common
law were these early limitations on the action that many of our states
for a long time felt themselves bound by them,9 and in a few states
they probably restrict the action on the case for inducing breach of

contract, to this day.'
'While it is unnecessary for present purposes to trace the growth of the
doctrine from its very earliest stages, it may be noted that the ancient actio indirecta of the time of Bracton, which in turn was derived from the actio iniurarum of the paterfamiliasin the Roman Law for the loss of services due to violence committed upon his servants (JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES, Book IV, tit. 4, § 3:
I Britton (Nichols') 131 (1277)) furnished the basis of the old common law
recovery by a master for loss of the use of a household servant.
'Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARv. L. Rav. 663, 665;
WI
oRE, INTERFERENCE WITH SOCIAL REATIONS (1887) 764, 765.
'The common law action was "not based upon questions of contract, but
upon proof of the relationship of master and servant," it was not a question of
contract, but simply of an existing state of services and the loss of those services. Sayre, op. cit. supra note 5, at 665. But see Walker v. Cronin, io7 Mass.
555, 567 (i87i).
723 Edw. III (1349).
8
Supra note 6.
9
Thus in New York, it was held that as the English STATUTE OF LABORERS
on which the early English cases based their decision, was not in force in that
state, an employer could not recover against one who induces the breach of such
a contract in the absence of some violence used, or other tortious means in procuring the servant to leave his employment. De Jong v. Behrman, 148 App.
Div. 37, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1O83 (1912); Daly v. Cornwall, 34 App. Div. 27, 54
N. Y. Supp. io7 (1898). This limitation remained in New York until very
recent years when the rule in that state was made to conform to the majority
doctrine. As illustrating the present attitude in New York, see Posner Co. v.
Jackson. 223 N. Y. 325, 119 N. E. 573 (1918) ; Lamb v. Chenev, 227 N. Y. 418,
125 N. E. 817 (192o); Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923).

" Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492 (1893) (holding that there
must be force or fraud used by the third party in procuring the breach of contract) ; Brown Hardware Co. v. Indiana Stove Works, 69 S. W. 8o5 (Tex. Civ.
App. 19o2) (holding that the old rule that a party is liable in tort for enticing
away another's servant does not extend beyond the strict relation of master and
servant in menial service) ; Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121 (1891) ; Bourlier

NOTES

The vast majority of jurisdictions 1 including England,' 2 however, no longer consider themselves bound by these restrictive vestiges
in the law. More recent decisions, pronouncing broad principles of
tort liability,18 have united to form the general rule of responsibility
ex delicto for maliciously procuring a party to a contract to breach it.
First, but reluctantly and with a powerful dissent by Lord Coleridge,
set forth in the important case of Lumley v. Gye,1 4 the doctrine has
steadily grown, until it may now be considered that it is not only
morally but legally wrong to maliciously induce another to breach his
contract.
The rapidity with which the action has achieved importance and
popularity has been aptly described by Professor Sayre:
"The most remarkable feature in the growth of this tort
action is the surprising rapidity with which courts have adopted
it, broadened it, and pared away restricting limitations. Conceived originally as a doctrine applicable . . . to a contract of

purely personal services, the doctrine was broadened to include
all contracts . . . with perhaps a few classes of cases arbitrarily excepted." 15
v. Macauley, 91 Ky. i35, i5 S. W. 6o (i8gi); Glencoe Land & Gravel Co. v.
Hudson Bros., 138 Mo. 439, 40 S. W. 93 (1897) ; McCann v. Wolff, 28 Mo. App.
447 (888) ; Swain v. Johnson, 151 N. C. 93, 65 S. E. 61q (19O9); Sleeper v.
Baker, 22 N. D. 386, 134 N. W. 786 (igx); Banks v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber
Co., 46 Wash. 61o, go Pac. io48 (19O7); Kline v. Eubanks, iog La. 241, 33 So.
211 (1902).

'Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 5og, 5o S. E. 353
(igo5) ; Doremus v. Hennesy, I76 Ill. 6o8, 52 N. E. 9z4 (i898) ; London Co. v.
Horn, 2o6 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526 (I9O3) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner
Dairy Co., io7 Md. 556, 69 AUt. 4o5 (i9o8) ; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555
(1871); Wheeler Stenzel Co. v. American Window Glass Co., 202 Mass. 471,
89 N. E. 28 (igog) Joyce v. Great Northern Ry. Co., ioo Minn. 225, iio N.
W. 975 (Igo7) ; Haskie v. Griffin, 75 N. H. 345, 74 Ad. 595 (I909) ; Jersey City
Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 AUt. 230 (1902); Schonwald v.
Ragains, 32 Okla. 223, 122 Pac. 2o3 (1912); Flaccus v. Smith, I99 Pa. 128,
48 At. 894 (i9oi). The plaintiff in such cases, not only has a good cause of
action against the one inducing the breach, but also, of course, against the one
breaking the contract. While he can have but one satisfaction, he has been allowed to join both in the same suit. Gunn v. Barr, supra note x; Sorenson v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 214 N. W. 754 (Minn. 1927).

, Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216 (Eng. 1853) ; Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D.
333 (1881); Temperton v. Russell, [1893] i Q. B. D. 715; POLLOcic, ToaRTS
(ioth ed. 1916) 343 and cases cited therein.
"See opinion of Lord Macnaghten in Quinn v. Leathem, [igoi] A. C. 495
at 510: "A violation of legal rights committed knowingly is a cause of action,
and it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law if there is no sufficient justification for the interference."
In Walker v. Cronin, supra note ii, at 562, it is said: "The intentional causing of loss to another, without justifiable cause, and with the malicious purpose
to inflict it, is of itself a wrong."
"Supra note 12.
SAYEp, op. cit. supra note 5, at 674.
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As the action for inducing breach of contract to marry falls not
within the rule, but within the exception, if, indeed, it is not the sole
exception, the reasons that have been advanced for such exception
must now be closely examined. For, if in one breath we admit that
the defendant's conduct in such cases may be "contemptible and blamable" 10 and in the next we declare that the plaintiff shall not maintain
his action because his case falls within an arbitrary exception, we have
a situation that is most disconcerting to him who seeks a remedy in
the law. The courts have attempted to justify the exception, but with
such a contrariety of reasoning as of itself urges a close examination
into the validity of each one of the arguments and analogies advanced
in the cases.
In Stiffier v. Boehmy the court denied recovery on the ground
that "though an action of the character mentioned is maintainable
against one who meddles with the spouse of another" its basis is loss
of consortium, and "such loss cannot arise in the case of a single man
or woman." 1s The theory of the plaintiff's case seems to have been
completely misconceived. The plaintiff was not suing for loss of consortium, but solely for the malicious procuring of a breach of contract
to marry. Such a suit is not even to be assimilated to an action for
loss of consortium, but is based on the loss of the promised advantages of the marriage, and the same measure of damages should be
used in such ease as is customary in the ordinary breach of promise
suit. Unless cogent reasons for excepting contracts to marry from
the general rule were set forth, the court, it is submitted, should have
held the defendant liable on the facts, in accordance with the general
rule in actions on .the case for inducing breach of contract.' 0
Many cases rely on the passage already quoted above from
Cooley. 0 With reference thereto it is, however, to be noted that:
(i) No authorities are cited to support the text. (2) The statement
is taken verbatim from the first edition of Cooley published in 1879.21
This preceded the important English decisions of Bowen v. Hall
(i88I) 22 and Temperton v. Russell (1893),23 both of which greatly
extended the scope of the action on the case for inducing breach of
contract. Indeed, Cooley wrote the first edition of his work long
before the action had been generally understood and accepted. In
view of these indubitable facts, the statement appears merely to be a
' CooLEY, loc. cit. supra note 2.
27124 Misc. 55, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 187 (1921).
'Cf. Case v. Smith, 107 Mich. 416, 65 N. W. 279 (1895); Davis
v. Condit, 124 Minn. 365, 144 N. W. lO89 (1914), 5o L. R. A. (. s.) 142, ANN.
CAS. 1915 B. 544- See (1914) 62 U. OF PA. L. REv. 748; Holbrook, Meaning of
Consortittz (1923) 22 MicH. L. REV. I.
'9See cases supranotes i and 12.
Slepra note 2.
i CooLEY, ToRTs (Ist ed. 1879) 236.
'Supra note 12.

SIbid.
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declaration of the general rule existing at that time, namely, that no
action would lie in any case for inducing a breach of contract other
than one of services, -4 and the editor of the third edition apparently
copied the statement, ignoring the fact that the general rule had
changed in the meantime. (3) He makes no mention of the case
where the defendant's conduct is malicious. Taken literally, he would
consider a malicious intermeddler in the same class as a parent bona
fide advising a child. Certainly the cases are dissimilar, and to deny
the right of action against a dutiful parent is not to deny it against the
stranger who acts without color of justification. (4) He admits that
the defendant's conduct may be contemptible and blamable. In view
of this admission, the burden should surely rest upon the one contending for an exception to the general rule bf liability, to prove the existence of such exception. In all fairness it must be stated that the
passage from the learned author is not only ambiguous but is clearly
lacking in weight as an authority, except for the consideration that is
due any statement by the learned jurist.
The most serious of the objections offered to the maintenance of
the action is that it conflicts with rules of public policy and social
expediency now too well settled to be brought into question. It is
undoubtedly true that when human relations become "affected with a
public interest" courts are inclined to limit the general rule and treat
the situation as sui generis. As regards the particular problem under
discussion, several specific reasons have been suggested in the cases
for this attitude of general unwillingness to interfere.
It is urged that the action for breach of promise has never been
in good repute,25 being too much abused by certain unscrupulous
females, and that therefore it should not be extended. Accordingly,
it is argued, as there is no precedent to be found for an action for
inducing a breach of promise, it is well that there never shall be one."'
The criticism, however, is hardly applicable, as there is little analogy
between a breach of promise suit and an action on the case for maliciously inducing another to breach his promise. Moreover, assuming
that the criticism is applicable, its validity is doubtful, as it may well
be questioned whether a common law action should be curtailed
because of abuse by a few unscrupulous litigants. -No action has been
more abused than the action on the case for negligence-yet it would
hardly be urged that it should therefore be abolished.
In this connection see supra notes 4-6.
Brown, Breach of Promise Suits (1929) 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 474.
Cf. Gunn v. Barr, i D. L. R. 855 (Canada, i926) in which case Harvey,
C. J., at p. 856, says: "It is urged that there is no precedent to be found for an
action for inducing the breaking of a promise, but it may be answered that there
never is a precedent until one is made, but one naturally hesitates to make a new
legal precedent at this stage of the history of the law on a point of such comparatively common occurrence. It may be noted, however, that it is only within
the last twenty-five years that the broad principle has been definitely established
that the inducing of the breach of contracts generally gives rise to a cause of

action.

...
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It has also been argued that "to hold that a third party may be
subject to answer in damages for advising or inducing an engaged
person to break the engagement might result in a suit by every disappointed lover against his successful rival." 27 Likewise, the fear
has often been expressed that the allowance of such an action would
subject every parent who advised his child to end an improvident
engagement to an action for damages for loss of the marriage brought
by the unworthy suitor. Both arguments reveal a complete misunderstanding of the essentials of the action. It is universally admitted
that one who honestly believes the engagement to have been inconsiderately entered into, whether he be a parent or stranger, has full liberty
to advise the party to break it, without fear of liability. And this,
for the reason that malice is an essential ingredient of the tort along
with the knowledge of the existence of the contract. 2- If either of
these elements be absent, no cause of action exists in any jurisdiction. '-'

882.

' Per Morrisey, C. J., in Homan v. Hall, supra note I, at 73, 165 N. V. at

28"A few judges, during the infancy of the doctrine ventured the suggestion
that 'malice' here means no more than knowledge of the existence of the contract.
See Crompton, J., in Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, at 224. But subsequent
decisions have clearly negatived any such idea. The question of malice is disposed of by modem courts without reference to proof of knowledge on the part
of the defendant. Courts today take for granted that knowledge is a prerequisite for the tort just as fundamental as the infliction of damage; unless
both these elements can be proved it is unnecessary even to consider the question
of 'malice'." Sayre, op. cit. . upra note 5, at 675. Accord: Clark v. Clark, 63
N. J. L. I, 42 At. 770 (1899). A few authorities still hold that, as the breaking
of a contract is an unlawful act, one procuring such a breach "is causing an
unlawful act, which is in itself unlawful" and this apart from any question of
malice. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Baltimore Ice Co., 1O7 Md. 556, 69 Ad. 405
(i9o8).
I Of course, there is the additional element of proximate causation. Unless
proximate causation can be proved, no liability can arise. Wolf v. New Orleans
Tailor-Made Pants Co., i13 La. 388, 37 So. 2 (9O4).
In 2 COOLEY, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 948, it is stated: "An action cannot, in general, be maintained for
inducing a third person to break his contract with the plaintiff; the consequence,
after all, being only a broken contract, for which the party to the contract may
have his remedy by suing upon it." This statement of the law is taken from
the earlier editions of the work and is inconsistent with the now well-recognized
doctrine of Lumley v. Gye. The correct rule is stated by Schofield, The Principle of Luimley v. Gye and Its Application (1888) 2 HARv. L. REV. 19, at 21 n.:
"One effect of the decision in Lumley v. Gye is to give the plaintiff two causes of
action, one in tort and the other in contract, for what may be substantially the
same damage. As the causes of action are distinct and consistent, the plaintiff
is not obliged to elect, and a recovery upon one cannot be a bar to an action upon
the other, but the plaintiff is not entitled to double compensation, and, it would
seem, in the absence of direct authority, that an actual recovery of damages in
one action ought to be admissible in evidence to reduce damages in the other.
Such damages is, to be sure, the direct act of the party who breaks the contract,
but the defendant is chargeable therefor, upon the ground that he has done an
act which was likely to result in a breach of contract, and consequent damage to
the plaintiff, and he is liable for the probable consequences of his act, even
though the wrongful act of another must intervene to cause the damage." But cf.
Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East i (Eng. 18o6) ; see PIGGOTT, ToRTs (885) 364-5.

NOTES

As against the parent, or one standing in loco parentis, the inference
of malice would probably never arise, the privilege of parents or persons standing in that relation being in the nature of an absolute right.?
Courts have been, and undoubtedly will be, willing to permit parental
interference to be exercised to an almost unlimited extent, in order
to avoid the consequences of improvident marriages.
In this connection, malice may be defined as "the lack of justification." "- What constitutes justification, in turn, is not to be determined by any formula or rule of thumb, but in each case is to be
ascertained by a balancing of individual and social interests. 32 Professor Sayre introduces a different test for the existence of malice,
from the one above described. His theory is summed up in the
following:
[The true test of the tort lies] "in the policy of the law to
accord to promises the same or similar protection as is accorded
to other forms of property." 11 [And] "if the true basis of the
tort is the policy of the law to prevent the stealing of promised
advantages, the necessary motive,-or, in the language of the
books, the requisite 'malice'-must be the conscious intention to
appropriate for oneself that which by law belongs to another,something akin to the animus furandiof a thief." 34
The accuracy of this analogy, however, is doubted by the author
himself, and he goes on to say that the tort is rather to be assimilated
'The principal case of Minsky v. Satenstein, supra note 3, holds that the

right of parents to interfere is absolute. Where the right is absolute, motive, of
course, is immaterial. ADDIsON, TORTS (8th ed. i9o6) 24; see Homan v. Hall,
supra note i. The rule is well stated by Harvey, C. J. in Gunn v. Barr, supra
note I, at 865. "It must be taken to be a matter of course that parents, for instance, may freely advise and urge and threaten their sons or daughters, at all
events in their earlier years. Doubtless a similar privilege extends, perhaps,
with less force, to other close relatives and even to persons merely in loco parentis. But I should be of opinion that in all cases, possibly, excepting a father or
a mother, the privilege is not absolute, but conditional on its being exercised
without malice."
'Legal malice does not necessarily mean malevolence, but merely implies
an intentional doing of the act without just cause. Walker v. Cronin, supra
note ii; Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 Atl. i65 (I9o6) ;
Lamb v. Cheney, supra note 9; Quinn v. Leathem, [igoi] A. C. 495; South
Vales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan, [i9o5] A. C. 246; Mogul S. S. Co.
v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598 (Eng. 1889); PicGorr, TORTS (1885) 366; I
STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIAamLrY (i9o6) 345; Wigmore, The Tripartite Division of Torts (1894) 8 HAav. L. REV. 200, 207.
Where tortious means have been used to bring about the breach of contract, to the detriment of a party thereto, "just cause" cannot be set up as a
defense. The use of illegal means clearly creates a cause of action in itself,
under one of the well recognized heads of tort-such as slander, assault and
battery, fraud, etc. POLLOCK, TORTS (ioth ed. 1916) 344; 1 STREET, op. cit.
supra, note 31, at 346.
'Brimelow v. Casson, [1924] I Ch. 302.
"Sayre, op. cit. supra note 5, at 675.
"Ibid. 679.
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to a conversion of the property of another to one's own use. The
latter analogy seems more accurate. Certainly it seems that the requisite malice 3 5 need not be an intent to appropriate the promised
advantages, but may consist in a wanton destruction of the rights of
another, or merely a malicious interference. 6 The action is not
fundamentally for appropriating property, if a contractual right is to
be likened to tangible property at all, but for malicious interference
causing damage or destruction. On the whole, it is submitted, it is
impossible to satisfactorily define the circumstances under which the
inference of malice will arise, and it should be left, it seems, to the
determination of the court in each case whether there is sufficient justification for the interference.37
In conclusion, it might be well to summarize the present condition
of the law on the subject. With the exception of the principal case,
Minsky v. Satenstein,is no American or English case has been found
that recognizes the action for inducing breach of contract to marry.
It seems to be recognized as a well established exception to the general
rule of liability for inducing a breach of other kinds of contracts.
The courts have pared away all limitations and exceptions to the general rule, but have allowed this one to remain. The reasons given are
(i) the action is based on loss of consortium, which right exists only
in the marriage status; (2) text opinion-notably that in Cooley on
Torts; (3) public policy. All three have been criticised above. An
intentional injury here, as elsewhere, it is submitted, should be actionable, unless justified. Certain it is that an action against a malicious
intermeddler, by one suffering from his mischief, is a legal adventure
on which the plaintiff would embark 'with considerable sympathy.
The cases reveal, instead of a logical analysis of the situation, only a
great deal of vague vituperation on the direful results that it is thought
would follow the recognition of the right of action.
M.L.G.
"Malice, as used in the books, means sometimes malevolence, sometimes
absence of excuse, and sometimes absence of a motive, for the public good.
If so 'slippery' a word . . . were eliminated from legal arguments and opinions, only good would result." Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor (19o5) 18 HARV. L. REv. 411, at
422.

so Cf. Tuttle v. Buck, lO7 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (igog).
'In Mogul S. S. Co.-v. McGregor, supra note 31, at 618 (889)

it is said:
"The good sense of the tribunal which had to decide would have to analyze
the circumstances and to discover on which side of the line each case fell."
See also Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation, [19031 2
K. B. 545. At 574, Romer L. J. states, ". . . regard might be had to the
nature of the contract broken, the position of the parties to the contract, the
grounds for the breach, the means employed to procure the breach, the relation of the person procuring the breach to the person who breaks the contract, and I think also to the object of the person in procuring the breach."
'Supra note 3.

NOTES
EFFECT OF LIMITATIONS VOID FOR REMOTENESS UPON PRIOR
ESTATES IN PENNSYLVANIA-Two recent decisions of the Pennsyl-

vania Supreme Court 1 make timely an analysis of this comparatively
neglected problem.
The rule against perpetuities renders void any interest which may
possibly not vest within some life in being and twenty-one years there-

after.2 It has no concern with, nor any effect upon, interests which
are vested, or which must vest, within the allotted period. The general rule, as stated by Gray 3 and Cheshire, 4 is that the prior limitations
become what they would have been had the limitation of the avoided
future estates been omitted from the instrument; the rule against
perpetuities operates merely to cut off the too remote limitations. The
intentions of the testator are to be disturbed to no greater extent than

is absolutely required by the rule.5 If the prior estate is a fee, followed by an executory devise over on a contingency void for remote-

ness, the prior estate becomes an indefeasible fee. 6 If the prior

estate is for life only or other limited period, it remains as it is; 7 the
property, after the termination of such estate, goes to the "person to
whom property which has been invalidly devised or bequeathed goes,"
generally the heirs at law or the residuary legatees."
Of course, if in a will 9 creating successive limitations there
should be an express provision that, if some of the limitations fail,
the rest shall fall along with them, effect would have to be given to
that expressed intent of the testator. Moreover, it is conceivable
that carrying into effect the prior estates alone, after the failure of
the ulterior limitations, might work such injustice and be so manifestly contrary to the intention of the testator, as to make it incumbent
on the court to imply such a provision. It is with reference to these
situations that many dicta are to be found in the cases to the effect
that the general rule may sometimes have to be qualified, the valid
'Feeney's Estate, 293 Pa. 273, 142 Atl. 284 (1928); McCaskey's Estate,
293 Pa. 497, 143 At]. 209 (1928).
'GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PMPErUITEs (2d ed. i9o6) § 201 et seq.
I Ibid § 247.
'CHESHIRE,

MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1925)

477.

'Slade v. Patten, 68 Me. 380 (1878) ; Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563,
89 At. 1094 (1914); Lovering v. Worthington, xo6 Mass. 86 (1870); Rozell
v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N. W. 489 (1922) ; Wood v. Griffin, 46 N. H.
230 (1865); Kalish v. Kalish, i66 N. Y. 368, 59 N. E. 917 (igoi); Goodier
v. Johnson L. R., I8 Ch. Div. 44I (1876).
aCody v. Staples, 8o Conn. 82, 67 Atl. I (i9o7); Bunting v. Hromas,
304 Neb. 383, 177 N. W. 905 (1920) ; Smith v. Townsend, 32 Pa. 434 (1859);
Saxton v. Webber, 83 Wis. 617, 53 N. W. 905 (x892).
'McGill v. Trust Co., 94 N. J. Eq. 657, 121 At. 760 (1923); Greenough
v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (I92O) ; Goffe v. Goffe, 37 R 1. 542,
94 Atl. 2 (1915); Hooper v. Wood, 97 W. Va. 1, 125 S. E. 350 (924).

'See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 248.
'This problem is generally met with in wills. It may arise, and is the
same, in deeds of settlement. Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 123 N. E.
135 (1919).
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and invalid limitations deemed inseparable, and fall together.' 0 The
justification for any such qualification, let it be noted again, is the
fulfillment of an expressed or very clearly implied intention of the
testator. Cases of such genuine inseparability are rare. What the
testator has explicitly stated as his desire, even though in conjunction
with other objects, should have the utmost weight, and should not be,
and generally is not, disturbed, except where it is extraordinarily clear
that the intention of the testator would be better effectuated thereby.
Accordingly, not only is the qualification, in most jurisdictions, most
infrequently applied, but the general trend seems to be toward a further restriction of its application.:"
In Pennsylvania the law on this point appears to have undergone
a peculiar development 12 and produced some unusual and startling
results. The Pennsylvania rule, as recently laid down by Mr. Chief
Justice von Moschzisker, is as follows :'
. . . Does the general testamentary scheme under attack
indicate a plan in which the dominant intent was not to create life
estates particularly to benefit those who were to enjoy them, but
to create such estates as incidental to and for the principal purpose
of supporting remainders, which might not vest till a time beyond
that allowed by law. If so, the whole scheme fails."
This test, even on first glance, appears to be a strange and vague
way of expressing the general rule, with an unwarranted emphasis
upon, and a peculiar turn given to, the qualification. This warrants
an examination of the precedent on which it rests.
4
In Johnson's Estate,"
the first case in which this test is laid
down, real estate was devised to trustees for a term of seventy-five
years, during which they were to pay the income to testator's children
and the legal descendants of those deceased, and at the end of the
period were to sell the real estate and distribute the proceeds among
testator's children or their legal descendants. The estate for seventy" See cases cited supra note 5.
'The prior estates were destroyed in the following: Benedict v. Webb,
98 N. Y. 46o (1885) ; see Van Vechten v. Van Vechten, 8 Paige 120 (N. Y.
184o) ; Hewitt v. Green, 77 N. J. Eq. 358, 77 Atl. 25 (igio) (this decision has
been weakened by that in McGill v. Trust Co., supra note 7) ; St. Amour v.
Ricard, 2 Mich. 294 (1852) (this case was virtually overruled in Rozell v.
Rozell, supra note 5); Eldred v. Meek, 183 Ill.
26, 55 N. E. 536 (1899);
Lockridge v. Mace, iog Mo. 162, i8 S. W. 1145 (I89r) (the last two cases
are opposed to the weight of authority, being decided in jurisdictions which,
like Pennsylvania, apply the qualification in a peculiar fashion and with unusual readiness). The writer has been unable to find a case decided within the
past ten years, applying the qualification, outside of Pennsylvania.
2The development in Illinois seems to have been similar.
See KALEs,
ESTATES FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS (I920) § 705 et seq.
"Feeney's Estate, 293 Pa. 273, at 288, i42 Atl. 284, at 290 (1928).
14

85 Pa. I79, 39 AtI. 879 (i898).

.NOTES

five years, although declared valid in itself, was held to fail with the
void gift at the end of the period, 15 on the ground that the dominant
intent of the testator was to violate the rule by the distribution at the
end of the period, and that the particular estate was merely incidental
to, and a means to accomplish, the main illegal object. 16 Such language makes one pause and wonder wherein lies the utility of reaching
a conclusion on so hazy and speculative a problem, as to which estate,
the valid or invalid, was testator's chief or "dominant" concern. The
utility cannot lie in the better effectuation of testator's intent, because
the limitations are clearly separable. The proposition that the testator,
merely because what the court questionably calls his "dominant purpose" has been frustrated, would have wanted another plainly avowed
desire, namely the payment of the income as specified for the period,
to be likewise set aside, is most difficult to sustain. In fact, the contrary seems almost incontrovertible, since, at the end of the period,
those who would have taken through the intestacy laws, would have
been the testator's sons or their legal representatives, the very persons
whose taking, at the end of the period, the court deemed testator's
main concern.
Johnston's Estate was dutifully followed in Gerber'sEstate 17 and
in Kountz's Estate,"" on different sets of facts. In the former, the
estate was left to trustees to pay to testator's grandchildren and to
charities certain fixed annuities consuming only a fraction of the income; the accumulated income and principal was to be divided equally
among the heirs of the testator's son, after the death of all of testator's
grandchildren and when his youngest great-grandchild shall have
reached twenty-two. The court held the bequests to testator's grandchildren and to the charities to fall with the void gift over, and testator's son took the entire estate absolutely. Thus the testator's deliberate omission to leave anything to his son was completely overthrown.
Instead of foreseeing this, the court continued the quest for the "dominant intent." The fact that the annuities consumed only one-fifth of
the income was hailed by the court as very significant that the purpose
of the creation of the particular estate was not to pay these annuities,
but merely to tie up the estate beyond the period allowed. The danger
Contra: Lyons v. Bradley, 168 Ala. 505, 53 So. 244 (igio); De Kay v.
Irving, 5 Denio 646 (N. Y. 1846); In re Wise [1896] 1 Ch. 281.
"' In

Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354, 2o AtI. 521 (x8go), the general rule

alone was declared. In Johnston's Estate, the court cited tat case, confessed
to an absence of Pennsylvania authorities for its decision, but stated that there
must be an exception to the general rule where to let the prior estates stand
would not be in furtherance of testator's intent. For authorities the court depended upon several New York decisions based upon peculiar New York statutes, and upon Thorndike v. Loring, I5 Gray 391 (Mass. i86o), where the sole
purpose of a trust created for a period of 5o years, was to accumulate the income for distribution, along with the principal, at the end of the period. See
GRAY, op. cit. stpra note 2, § z49a.
1 i96 Pa. 366, 46 Atl. 497 (igoo).
"S2I3 Pa. 39O, 62 AUt.

I3

(19o6).
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inherent in the "dominant intent" formula becomes more apparent in
this case. However, in Kounts's Estate the court goes even farther.
Here the trustee was to pay the entire income of the estate to testatrix's children; and after their deaths and the lapse of ten years from
the date when her youngest grandchild became of age, the whole estate
was to be divided among the grandchildren. The court held the gift
of the entire income to fail along with the void gift of the principal,"
declaring "that the chief purpose . . . was . . . to . . . place
it beyond the power of either the children or grandchildren to interfere with the distribution" or to partake of the corpus until after the
specified period. The result of the decision was to give the estate
absolutely to the heirs at law-testatrix's husband and children-the
very persons that testatrix was anxious should never touch the corpus,
according to what the court had itself declared to be her "chief purpose"! In the face of the last two decisions it could not longer be
argued that the Pennsylvania rule was being used to effectuate testator's intent. Rather it appears that the testator was being punished
for his violation of the rule against perpetuities, by having his entire
settlement destroyed.
Let us consider two cases in which the prior estates were permitted to stand. In Whitman's Estate 20 the trustee was to pay the
income to testator's daughter for life-then the principal was to be
divided up for daughter's children, the male children to get their
shares of the principal upon reaching twenty-one, the female children's
shares to be held in trust for their lives, their children (testator's
great-grandchildren) to get the principal of the shares. If the daughter died without issue, the estate was to go to Yale University. In a
suit by the daughter to have the entire will declared void, the court
held her life estate valid. An important factor was that this life
estate supported both a valid remainder and a partially invalid one.
To destroy the life estate would make it impossible, upon the occurrence of a not too remote contingency--the death of the daughter
without issue-to carry out testator's clear desire to benefit Yale University. Where one estate does not precede the other, but the two
are alternative in the sense that one of the two must vest in possession
at the termination of the particular estate, their separability is more
apparent. 2
Moreover, as regards the remainder to the descendants,
the rule was only partially violated, the remainder to the male children
being valid. The transgression, it would seem, was so comparatively
slight as not to call for any punishment.
"°But see Price's Estate, 260 Pa. 376, lO3 Atl. 893 (1918) ; Lockhart's
Estate, 267 Pa. 390, III Atl. 254 (1920). Contra: Johnson's Trustee v. Johnson, 79 S. W. 293 (Ky. 1904); McGill v. Trust Co., supra note 7; Hawkins
v. Ghent, 14o Atl. 212 (Md. 1928); Hooper v. Wood, supra note 7; Gooding
v. Read, 43 Eng. Rep. 6o6 (1853).
2'248 Pa. 285, 93 Atl. 1O62 (i915).
I Cf. Quinlan v. Wicknan, 233 Ill. 39, 84 N. E. 38 (io8); Moroney v.
Haas, 277 Ill. 467, i15 N. E. 648 (1917).

NOTES

In Ewalt v. Davenhill,22 the testator, who had been given by the
will of his father a special power of appointment over real estate,
devised it to trustees to pay the income therefrom to his children for
their lives, remainder to their issue. The plaintiff was the grantee of
one of testator's children, praying for a partition. The trusts for
the lives of the children were held valid, notwithstanding the remoteness of the gift over.23 However, in Crolius v. Kramer 24 the facts
were essentially the same, yet the court held the beneficial life interests
invalid, and gave the children the absolute title. The only difference
in the facts of the two cases was that the latter case was an action for
breach of contract brought by the children of testator, all of whom
had joined in selling the property to the defendant, as opposed to a
bill for a partition by the grantee of one of them. It would seem,
therefore, that the determining influence in Ewalt v. Davenhill was
the court's apprehension that a partition might materially depreciate
the value of the interests of the children who still retained them. But
then, such considerations have nothing to do with the testator's intention, with whether the limitations are separable or inseparable.
Geissler's Estate 25 marks the extreme in the application of the
test. The income was left to the testator's children for their lives,
then to the grandchildren for their lives, remainder to the great-grandchildren. All the interests were held to fail. 26 Of all the cases cutting down the prior estates, the transgression might be said to be the
slightest here. The manner in which the court arrives at its decision
indicates strikingly the extent to which the general rule has been submerged in Pennsylvania. After merely citing Johnston's Estate,
Gerber's Estate and Kountz's Estate, the court 2concludes that, as a
matter of course, the antecedent estates must fall.
In the recent case of Feeney's Estate 28 the testator, after giving
equal shares absolutely to six of his seven sons, gave another share in
trust to pay the income to his other son for life, then to the latter's
Pa. 385, ioi Adt. 756 (917).
' The remoteness of an appointment depends upon its distance from the
creation and not from the exercise of the power. See GRAY, op. cit. supra)
note 2, § 514.
1279 Pa. 275, 123 Ad. 8o8 (1924).
W257 Pa. 329, ioi Atl. 797 (197).
'Accord: Lockridge v. Mace, supra note io; Contra: Greenough v. Osgood, supra note 7; Rozell v. Rozell, supra note 5; Turner v. Safe Deposit
Co., 148 Md. 371, 128 Adt. 294 (925).
'Ledwith v. Hurst, 284 Pa. 94, 13o At. 315 (1925), again indicates that
the deliberateness or the extent of the violation of the rule against perpetuities has some connection with the determination as to whether the prior limitations shall stand. The testator's widow and daughter were to receive the
income from real estate for their lives, then the income was to be paid to
daughter's issue and descendants without limit. Says the court, in holding
the life estates of the widow and daughter to fail, "It is not easy to conceive
of a more flagrant violation of the rule against perpetuities."
'Supra note i.
=257
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children for their lives, and the corpus to then go to the residuary
legatees or their heirs. The residuary legatees were the six sons.
The court held the life interests to the son and the son's children to
fail with the void gift of the corpus, 29 on the ground that "the will
shows a paramount purpose to keep this part of the estate
entire beyond the period allowed by law, and not to give William or
his line any of the corpus." 30 Thus this part of the estate went, according to the intestate laws, to the seven sons. 31
In the recent case of McCaskey's Estate, 2 where, on the other
hand, the dominant interest was construed to be to benefit those for
whom the life estates were created, it is rather uncertain whether there
was any violation of the rule against perpetuities at all.83
The decision in Feeney's Estate is comprehensible only against
the background of Pennsylvania decisions. Its wisdom and fairness
are doubtful; and in it the workings of the "dominant intent" notion
develop into abstruse mental gymnastics. Had the life estates of the
son and his children been allowed to stand, that much of the testator's
clear intent would have been carried out. The testator's other wish,
that the corpus go to the other six sons or their heirs, would be
approximately fulfilled, since, after the termination of the two life
interests, the corpus would, by the intestate laws, pass to the seven
sons or their heirs. True, that would mean that the descendants of
the one son, to whom the testator did not choose to give a share of
corpus, would take one-seventh of the corpus at that distant time,
which the court considers contrary to testator's main intent. But the
result of the court's decision is to let the son himself take one-seventh
of the corpus immediately, and besides to destroy the life estates.
This clearly seems to do greater violence to the testator's desires.
Giving the strictly alternative meaning to "or" in the phrase, "the residuary legatees or their heirs," the class which would take the corpus might
not be ascertained, and so the gift to that class might not vest, until after
lives in being and 21 years. Coggin's Appeal, 124 Pa. io, 16 Atl. 579 (1889) ;
Raleigh's Estate, 206 Pa. 451, 55 Atl. iii9 (19o3) ; Price's Estate, 279 Pa.
511, 124 At. 179 (1924). See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 110, Iioa, 205a.
so293 Pa. 273, at 287, 842 AtI. 284, at 290.
1 Act of 1917, P. L. 429 §7 (c),
PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §8357. Wills
Act of I917, P. L. 403, 409, § 15 (c), PA. STAT. (West, 1920), § 8325, to the

effect that testamentary bounties which fail because contrary to law, "shall
be included in the residuary devise or bequest, if any," was held not to apply
in a case where the residuary bequest was unlawful in itself.
' Supra note 2. In this case, the court also announced the interesting proposition that the court must appoint trustees named by the cestuis, provided they
are competent See Comment (1929) 42 HARv.L. Rav. 446.
* The trustees were to pay to the testator's children the income for their
lives. The male children were to get part of the principal of their shares upon
reaching specified ages. The income of the daughters' shares, after latter's
death, was to be paid to their children till they reached 21, when they were
to get the principal. It was further provided that if any child should die
during the period of the trust, leaving issue, the issue should take the income
and principal in same manner as parent would have. The court decided that
whether or not this last provision violated the rule was immaterial in view
of its holding as to testator's dominant intent.

NOTES

It would seem that what was originally adopted as a mere quali-

fication to the general rule,"4 has been developed in Pennsylvania into

a means whereby the court secures for itself a vast amount of discre-

tionary power over the disposition of a decedent's estate under the

circumstances in question. What the court finds to be the so-called
"dominant intent" is determined by the court's discretion. While the

separability or inseparability of the limitations, that is, the presumed
intent of testator, has some weight, 3 it seems to be distinctly subordinate to the court's own conception of convenience and fairness.
Because of the discretion involved and because slight differences in
facts lead to different results, 6 no general rules regarding the application of the "dominant intent" test may with safety be laid down.
However, two main influences seem to be behind the marked severity
of the application: (I) The court's desire to wind up the estate; 37
(2)

The notion that the testator should be penalized for his violation

of the rule against perpetuities.33 One unfortunate result of the present state of the law is that no case of this kind can be said to really
be decided until it has been passed on, on appeal, by the Supreme
Court.
L.G.
REVOCABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL BUILDING PERMIT-The issuance of municipal 1 building permits is generally incidental to the
greater power of zoning, and indeed is the usual method of carrying
out the zoning ordinance. This zoning power is now sustained on the
theory that it is a valid exercise of the police power. Whatever doubts
as to the constitutionality of zoning formerly existed have been re3, See supra note 15.

"Whitman's Estate, supra note ig; Ewalt v. Davenhill, supra note 21.
Note particularly Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. I43, 1i6 Adt. 392 (0922), where the
court's decision would seem to be in furtherance of testator's fairly-to-bepresumed intent. The trustees were to accumulate the income of a vast estate
for 99 years, at the end of which period it was to be divided among the heirs of
testator's nephews. There was a provision that a mining company which
testator had controlled might work testator's own mining lands on a royalty
basis. This was held to fail with the void limitation at the end of the period
on the ground that it merely was a means whereby more income could be
accumulated for distribution at the end of the 99 years.
. Compare Ewalt v. Davenhill, supra note 21, with Crolius v. Kramer,
supra note 23.
'The winding up of the estate is the obvious result of cutting down the
valid life estates. It is generally, it will be noted, the one to whom the first
life estate has been given who takes the property absolutely through the intestate laws, and it is perhaps the feeling of the court that he can be trusted
to provide for his children, who generally would have been entitled to the
second valid estate. This, however, does not altogether apply to Feeney's
Estate, nor to Gerber's Estate, supra note 16.
I See Fou
, Rui.Fs AGAINST PERPETuITS, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATIOx
AND RESTRAINTS ON ENJOYMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA (1909) §§474, 475, 476.
'In this note the term "municipal" is used with reference to cities, towns,
villages, townships and similar local governing bodies.

530

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

moved by the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.' Nevertheless many associated problems still remain unsettled.
Suppose that a landowner is required by ordinance to secure a permit
before he can erect a building on his land. After securing the permit
he enters into contracts for the erection of his building, purchases
materials and partially completes the construction. Then the building
permit is revoked. Can the property owner assert any right to proceed with the work or must he obey the revoking order?
Most state decisions very clearly hold that the power to revoke
the permit is qualified and the Supreme Court of the United States
would seem to have settled the problem in the same way. Several
theories of the nature of the transaction have been advanced.
The theory that the permit holder has a vested right was first
enunciated in the leading case of City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne.3
There a permit to build was given and the permit holder partially
erected his building. The city then revoked the permit. The court
refused to allow the revocation on the ground that by acquiring the
permit and partially completing the building, the lot owner acquired
vested rights to which he was entitled to protection. In Dobbins v.
Los Angeles 4 the Supreme Court of the United States also said that
the permit holder acquired vested rights in the partially completed
structure of which he could not be deprived without due process of
law. Refusal to allow revocation has also been based on the fact that
it works a hardship on the lot owner.5 Properly conceived, this is
essentially the same thing as saying that the property owner has vested
rights of which he cannot be deprived unreasonably, because the mere
fact that a zoning ordinance works a hardship to a particular landowner is not sufficient to defeat its operation. For example, in
Hadacheck v. Sebastian 6 the effect of the zoning ordinance was to
reduce the value of the land from $8oo,ooo to about $6o,ooo and yet
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the ordinance.
What do the courts mean when they speak of "vested rights" in
this connection? It would seem to mean no more than that the state's
2272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1927), (1928)
54 A. L. R. io16, (1927)
40 HARV. L. REV. 644; (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 427. See also Baker, Constitutionality of Zoning (1925) 20 Ii. L. REV. 213; Byrne, The Constitutimality
of a GeneralZoning Ordinanwe (927) I MARQUE'r"E L. REV. i89; Note (924)

72 U. oF PA. L. REV. 421.
3 134 N. Y. 163, 31 N. E. 443 (1892).
'195 U. S. 223, 25 Sup. Ct. 18 (904).
Laramie, 262 Pac. 22 (Wyo. 1927). Cf.

See also Wickstrom v. City of
Dainese v. Cooke, 91 U. S. 58o
(1875). In Shreveport v. Dickason, i6o La. 563, 107 So. 427 (1926) it was
suggested by way of dictum that this vested right is to the use of the property
free from the zoning power.
. Harrison v. Hopkins, 48 R. I. 42, 135 At. 154 (1926); see also People
ex rel. Ortenberg v. Bales, 224 App. Div. 87, 229 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1928).
6239 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143 (915).
The extreme hardship of this
particular decision can be somewhat explained by the fact that the use, a
brickyard, was very close to constituting a nuisance.

NOTES

control over private property is limited by certain considerations of
fairness and reasonableness, or as Mr. Justice Sutherland said in
Nectow v. City of Cambridge:7
"The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations
with the general rights of the landowner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and, other questions aside, such
restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial
relation to the public health, morals or general welfare."
Another theory advanced is that when the municipality has
granted a permit and the lot owner makes contracts and starts erection
on the strength of the permit, the municipality is estopped later to
revoke the permit." However, the municipality does not make a contract with the permit holder, but merely confers on him the right to
use his property in a certain way. The permit is merely an administrative approval of a proposed building. While it might be argued
that relying on the permit, the property owner changes his position,
there is no representation by the government that it will not exercise
the police power in the future to rezone. On the contrary, it is well
settled that the state cannot bargain away its police power."
Some cases go even further and seem to hold that the municipality can revoke the permit at any time before completion of the building. The reasons for this view are thus expressed by the Arkansas
court:
"The permit was merely the granting of a privilege, and did
not constitute a contract between city and appellant. No vested
rights were obtained by obtaining a permit, and none arose in the
acquisition of property or preparations for the construction of the
building. .
. ,, o1
However, the proposition that the right to revoke the permit cannot
be exercised unreasonably any more than that the general power to
zone itself can be exercised unreasonably, seems only too obvious. In
the light of the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States
148 Sup. Ct. 447, 448 (U. S. 1928).

'Pratt v. City and County of Denver, 72 Colo. 51, 54, 209 Pac. 5o8, 5o9
see Keane v. City of Portland, 115 Ore. 1, 235 Pac. 677 (g25) ; cf.
Hamilton v. City of Chicago, 227 Ill. App. 291, 299 (1923).
(1921) ;

' The cases are collected in 12 C. J. 912 § 423, where it is said: "The police
power is a governmental function, and neither the state legislature, nor a)ny

inferior legislative body . . . can alienate, surrender, or abridge the right to
exercise such power by any grant, contract, or delegation whatsoever."
"°Wilder v. Little Rock, i5o Ark. 439, 442, 234 S. W. 479, 480 (ig).
Accord: Matter of Bregman, i31 Misc. 486, 226 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1927),
(0928) 40 HARV. L. REv. 667. In Douglass v. City of Greenville, 92 S. C.
374, 75 S. E. 687 (1912) the court sustained the revocation on the theory that
it would not look into the motives of the legislating body, and would not subject the rezoning to judicial review.
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in the Dobbins case, decisions to the contrary seem inexplicable,
although the Ohio Court of Appeals decided precisely to that effect
1

only a year ago.
It can be taken as sound law that there is some limitation on the

power of the municipality to revoke a building permit. The question
remains as to what acts on the part of the property owner the courts
have held sufficient to give him what is generally described as a "vested

right" to complete his building.

Practically all courts have agreed

that if no acts are done in reliance on the permit, it can be revoked at13
2

any time." Assuming of course that the permit is legally valid,
merely securing a permit and entering into contracts for the building
14
work has been held not enough to prevent revocation of the permit.
The courts seem willing to say that anything beyond the entering into
contracts will be enough to prevent the revocation of the permit. In
some cases the opinions state that there were "expenses incurred," and

held that enough. 15 Most of the cases say that there had been some
amount of construction before the revocation. "Beginning work," "I
"doing considerable work, expenditure of labor and materials," 17 are
examples of what courts have held sufficient. In several cases the
property owner had let contracts and had the foundations dug and the
walls begun.'"
In one case the permit holder had his building all
completed except for the roof when the permit was revoked.'5
When
the building is completed there can be no longer any problem of revocation of a permit, and the analogous question that then arises is
whether the municipality zone retroactively.
'Cahn v. Guion, I6o N. E. 868 (Ohio 1927) where the court followed
State ex rel. Ohio Hair Products Co. v. Rendigs, 98 Ohio St. 251, 12o N. E.
636 (1918) a nuisance case.
Massachusetts has a unique view, that the licensing authorities cannot
revoke the permit without express power to do so, conferred by statute or
ordinance, but holds that revocation can be effected merely by a change of
ordinance or statute. General Baking Co. v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 242 Mass. 194, 136 N. E. 245 (1922); City of Lowell v. Archambault,
189 Mass. 73, 145 N. E. 269 (1924). Cf. Wasilewski v. Biedrzchki, 18o Wis.
633, 192 N. W. 989 (923).
'Rehmann v. City of Des Moines, 200 Iowa 286, 204 N. W. 267 (1925),
4o A. L. R. 922 (1926); People ex rel. Publicity Leasing Co. v. Ludwig, 172
App. Div. 71, 158 N. Y. Supp. 208 (1916); City of New York v. Herdje, 68
App. Div. 370, 74 N. Y. Supp. 104 (1902).
Cuerck v. City and County of Denver, 78 Colo. 246, 242 Pac. 47 (925).
"Rehmann v. City of Des Moines; City of New York v. Herdje, both
supra note 12.
Carswell Construction Co. v. City of Sidney, 6i D. L. R. 514 (Nova
Scotia, 1921) ; Matter of Fuller v. Schwab, 124 Misc. 659, 2o8 N. Y. Supp.
57 (I925); Hinman v. Clarke, 121 App. Div. lO5, Io5 N. Y. Supp. 725 (1907).
" Dobbins v. Los Angeles, supra note 4.
17 Pratt v City and County of Denver, supra note 8.
' 8 City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, supra note 3; People ex rel. Ortenberg v.
Bales, supra note 5; People ex rel. Evens v. Kleinert, 201 App. Div. 751, 195
N. Y. Supp. 711 (1922).
" Dainese v. Cooke, supra note 4.

NOTES

Supposing that the landowner has substantially changed his position, the problem whether the authorities may not rezone anyhow
under certain circumstances seems to be subject to the same principles
as the question whether the state can zone retroactively. Retroactive
zoning is generally avoided,2 0 but the question remains as to whether
the state has the power to zone retroactively. It would seem that it has,2
subject to the general limitations on all exercise of the zoning power,
namely that it must be substantially necessary. 22 In general it is obvious
that there must be a much greater necessity to justify retroactive zoning
than zoning as to future use. The fact that most zoning ordinances
allow the administrative authorities to make exceptions to the general
restrictions laid down, where they work a hardship, is evidence of
this fact. The same general considerations apply to revocation of the
permit where the owner has commenced to build on the strength of
the permit. Furthermore, the granting of a permit and its revocation
within a short period of time is some evidence of careless zoning, and
also of the fact that there is no substantial necessity for the change.
It would hardly seem possible that a community could change so
quickly, within the space of a few months as to require a rezoning of
a particular tract of land. Of course if it did change, then there
would seem to be no constitutional objection to rezoning. In determining whether there has been such a change no definite test can be
laid down beyond the general principle enunciated in the Euclid Village case,23 where Mr. Justice Sutherland said:
"Thus the question whether the power to forbid the erection
of a building of a particular kind or for a particular use . . .
is to be determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered apart, but by considering it in
connection with the circumstances and the locality."
E. H. B., Jr.
SBettinan, Constitutionality of Zoning (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 834.
"IHadacheck v. Sebastian, supra note 6; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, supra
note 4 at 238, 25 Sup. Ct at 20.

' The test of the Nectow case, supra note 7.
1 Supra note 2.

